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PANEL DISCUSSION 
(The following discussion is an edited version of the morning and 
afternoon panel discuss ion sessions.) 
PANELISTS 
Chairman: 
Professor L.F .E. Goldie 
Director, International Legal Studies 
Program, Syracuse University College of Law 
Mr. Michael Hardy, Esq. 
Legal Advisor, United Nations, New York 
Professor H. Gary Knight 
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
Dr. Fernando Labastida 
Legal Officer, United Nations, New York 
Dr. Gerard Mangone 
Senior Fellow, W.oodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars 
Commander William Palmer, U.S.N. 
Office of the Judge Advocate General, 
Washington, D.C. 
Professor Zdenek Slouka 
Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars 
The Chairman requested comments from the panel on the current 
state of discussions on the development of international machinery to 
regulate the uses of the deep seabed and the ocean floor. Noting that the 
Soviet Union has shown little interest in international controls, he 
asked if there was any ground for optimism for a global agreement. 
Professor Slouka was "pessimistic" about prospects of a universal 
agreement. Modern history knows no instances of global conventions 
effectively allocating space and resources among nations. The rule of 
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf defining the limits of 
coastal control over the sea-bed was rendered obsolete and ineffective 
by technology even before the treaty entered into force in 1964 for the 
twenty-two ratifying states. Except for the general rule that the coastal 
state has some exclusive rights over some portion of the adjacent sea-
bed-a rule legally independent of the Convention-the Convention on 
the Continental Shelf contains very little general accord on any concrete 
points of the law of the sea-bed. However, regional regimes of the 
continental shelf have emerged in the North Sea, in the Baltic Sea, in 
the Adriatic, and in the Middle East Region; in the Asian 
mediterranean area (Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia) still another 
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local system of order is also being developed on the basis of regional 
needs and local perceptions of international law. This is a dominant 
trend. While on the global level an international debate goes on, on the 
lower, regional and local levels states act according to their diverse and 
immediate needs. A related trend is characterized by national resort to 
unilateral assertions of regulatory powt:~s extended into high sea areas 
where such assertions are seen as defensible by some locally distinct 
imperatives; the Canadian claim of a right to exercise extensive 
pollution controls over shipping and other uses of the Arctic sea and its 
seabed is an outstanding example. 
Professor Knight was more optimistic. He considered the fact that 
such issues as pollution, fishing rights and access to the sea-bed are so 
pressing, that there will have to be a conference in the early 1970's that 
will implement "hard" agreements by 1980. 
Professor Slouka commented that the ratification process itself often 
takes up to eight years. Even when the Continental Shelf Convention 
finally received in 1964 the validating number of ratifications, it still 
covered continental shelves adjacent to less than thirty percent of the 
total sea coastline and did not apply to the majority of industrially 
important parts of the shelf. 
The Chairman emphasized the problem presented by the "special 
interests" of States, citing the refusal of the German Federal Republic 
to ratify the Continental Shelf Convention, because its own interests 
would have been badly jeopardized. He suggested the possibility of 
regional solutions within the framework of a universal or semi-
universal document which would give the regional settlement a 
perspective and a frame of reference. Such a universal document would 
be very important in resolving, for example, the volatile situation in the 
North China Sea off Ryuku where there is one of the world's largest 
submarine oil deposits, and Mainland China as well as Taiwan, Korea 
and Japan all have claims. 
Professor Knight, continuing his optimistic approach, pointed out 
that if ten or fifteen of the technologically powerful nations, and those 
with broad shelves, would commit themselves to an interim regime, 
such as that proposed by President Nixon on May 23, 1970, and as has 
been done in deep sea mining ventures, there would be some degree of 
international accord until a universal agreement is made. 
Mr. Hardy pointed out that an agreement, to be effective, would have 
to be generally supported by countries holding different political views 
and by both developed and developing countries. 
There was a question from the floor asking what the special-interest 
position was of the Chile, Ecuador and Peru countries regarding the 
sea-bed, and what they have said in the United Nations. 
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Professor Slouka responded that they would not oppose an 
international sea-bed regime as long as it did not undermine their 
exclusive fisheries claims and other assorted rights within the two 
hundred mile limits. 
Dr. Labastida added that the Latin American countries favor a 
comprehensive Law of the Sea conference, one that would largel :v 
rewrite the Law of the Sea, including the regimes of the high seas, the 
continental shelf, the territorial sea and contiguous zone, fishing rights, 
and the prevention of pollution and scientific research. 
Professor Slouka saw a reason for optimism in the possible impact of 
the global debate on the policies of the maritime states whose 
involvement in the ocean may make them more sensitive to outside 
pressures. Once they realize that no timely and effective solution can be 
had through the global policy-making process, they may start working 
out local solutions broadly compatible with such general principles as 
the global debate may help formulate and legitimize. He pointed to the 
influence that the United Nations sea-bed debate had on the moulding 
of the foreign policy of the United States concerning the regime of the 
deep ocean floor as it has evolved from 1967 to President Nixon's May, 
1970 proposals. 
In a comment from the audience, Professor Weeks of the Syracuse 
University College of Law introduced the Private International Law 
viewpoint on the hostile commercial uses of the sea-bed. He suggested 
that there may be commercial interests currently working very rapidly 
to attempt to exploit the sea-bed before there is time for an 
administrative regime to be established. He feared a kind of mootness 
that a United Nations regime might be faced with if commercial 
interests act first. The United Nations should structure a "halt" before-
the-fact kind of machinery. 
The Chairman indicated that not all commercial enterprises are so 
inclined, and some oppose the laissez-faire position of the National 
Petroleum Council. For example, Mr. John Laylin, counsel for the 
Kennicott Copper Corporation, advocates the establishment of an 
international regime and international reciprocity. 
In an additional comment, Professor Weeks asked if the copper 
companies' stance might not result from their position of technological 
superiority to the petroleum industry. 
Mr. Hardy drew attention to the fact that the manganese nodules 
(from which copper and other hard minerals can be derived) are widely 
distributed over the ocean floor, while exploitable oil and gas deposits 
are relatively close to the shore. Furthermore, whereas off-shore oil 
production was now in the region of seventeen to eighteen per cent of 
world production, a percentage which, though likely to increase, was 
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not likely to change drastically, it might be possible, according to some 
estimates, to meet a large amount of the world demand for the hard 
minerals in question from exploitation of a relatively small area of the 
ocean floor. 
The Chairman agreed that the copper companies' motives are not 
altruistic. He pointed out, however, that private international interests 
do put strange bed-fellows together . 
The Chairman then asked how far along we are towards at least some 
kind of viable formulation from the Sea-Bed Committee of the United 
Nations. 
Mr. Hardy said that a beginning had been made and that individual 
States were now at a stage where they were able to develop their own 
positions, as distinct from sharing in a general regional viewpoint. 
Further progress was 1 ikely to proceed through three sub-committees: 
one dealing with the future regime and machinery for the international 
area of the sea-bed; one dealing with Law of the Sea issues; and one 
dealing with marine pollution and scientific research. There were 
various problems of co-ordination as regards other United Nations 
bodies (such as the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, for 
example), dealing with the same- or related topics. In addition to the 
United States proposal, Tanzania had submitted a draft treaty, and 
others might be expected. 
The Chairman asked Dr. Mangone for his views on regionalism and 
universalism and what hopes there are for a common denominator. 
Dr. Mangone replied that we must take into account the new 
problems facing us. Some thirty to thirty-five States have alread:·• 
permitted oil concessions beyond the two hundred meter isobath. We 
must deal with the whole new thrust of pollution along with the 
traditional questions of fisheries and zones. In addition, we have good 
reason to believe that the Soviet Union and the United States are 
examining so-called defensive weapons that can be put upon the sea-bed 
to detect vessels that may be under water. Both have submarines that 
can rest submerged at great depths for indefinite periods of time. This 
is a "strategic element" of the pro bl em which was not foreseen just a 
few years ago. Thus, the pollution element and the strategic element 
must be added to fisheries and mineral resources issues to form a 
problem whose solution will require the accommodation of the interests 
of all the States. Professor Slouka's pessimistic view is certainh' 
accurate if one is looking for a global settlement on all of these issues at 
one time in the foreseeable future. But there are a broad range of 
possible negotiations. Some regimes may be worked out earlier and 
apart from others. The oil pollution regime, for example, may be the 
first one to be settled through a global system of monitoring how much 
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oil is being introduced into the oceans and by whom. Large and small 
nations would need to work out terms of "what is it that we want to get 
out as a common denominator of an international regime-what are 
we prepared to trade off." This would mean increasing intention by 
each State in its own national interest to find some means of 
accommodation. For example, the United States might wish to use her 
wealth of petroleum resources on an internationalized sea-bed as one of 
her trade-offs for defense considerations in gaining a narrow territorial 
sea. If Peru could be persuaded that she will have all the benefits of 
exploiting fish off her coast, she might agree to restrain her claims to 
wide territorial sea. 
Commander Palmer thought the trade-off situation should not be 
over-simplified, finding it difficult to see what a small territorial limit 
would have to do with defense considerations. 
Dr. Mangone compared the strategic element to chess: the object of 
the narrow territorial sea is to preserve the mobility of a powerful 
nation's fleet in moving around the oceans. The object is to keep the 
marine environment as open as possible to international passage, not 
hindered by wide territorial seas of coastal states. 
Commander Palmer stated his question as the opposite of that: what 
is the relevance, from the standpoint of a coastal State's security, of a 
broader territorial sea, given the range of submarine missiles? 
Dr. Labastida pointed out that many developing countries favor a 
wider territorial sea to prevent military and scientific research by the 
big powers, giving the big powers added advantage over them. 
Professor Slouka turned again to the pollution issue, pointing out the 
difficulty of getting treaties negotiated in a global forum and ratified on 
a global scale. The developing states would often find it impossible to 
accept anti-pollution agreements obligating them to build expensive 
shore installations for the disposal of oil wastes, or to equip their ships 
with costly anti-pollution equipment. Under such agreements, and 
without particular adjustments responding to the international 
economic asymmetries, the developing states would no longer be able to 
buy and operate older ships which often form the nucleus of their young 
merchant marine. A solution will have to be sought gradually with anti-
pollution standards adjusted to the geographical setting and other 
environmental factors as well as to the economic conditions of the 
individual states. This would then be an added pressure towards the 
emergence oi diverse local systems, often primitive, struggling and far 
from ideal; just as in the case of the sea-bed regime, here too impulses 
toward an early and easy establishment of a rational and uniform 
global system of control are lacking. 
Mr. Hardy said that suggestions had been made that the richer States 
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should aid the poorer ones in the event that anti-pollution measures 
were proposed requiring expensive technology. He also pointed out the 
difficulties involved in enforcing compliance with pollutfon regulations. 
In the case of fishing zones, fishing vessels can, up to a point, be stopped 
and inspected; the creation of anti-pollution zones or restrictions, 
potentially applicable as regards all vessels, including warships, raised 
more difficult problems as regards enforcement. 
The Chairman thanked the participants for their valuable 
contributions to clarifying thought on the problems of "ocean space" or 
"inner space" not only for Syracuse and the people at the Regional 
Meeting, but also for the wider audience whom, so he hoped, the 
published version of these proceedings would reach. 
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